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Abstract 
 
Becker’s analysis of crime and punishment has initiated a series of theoretical and 
empirical works investigating the determinants of crime. However, there is a dearth of 
literature in the context of developing countries. This paper is an attempt to address this 
deficiency. The paper investigates the relative impact of deterrence variables (load on 
police force, arrest rates, charge sheet rates, conviction rates and quick disposal of cases) 
and socio-economic variables (economic growth, poverty,, urbanization and education) 
on crime rates in India. State-level data is collected on the above variables for the period 
1999 to 2005.Zellner’s SURE model is used to estimate the model. Subsequently, this is 
extended by introducing endogeneity. The results show that both deterrence and socio-
economic factors are important in explaining crime rates. However, some of their effects 
are different from that observed in studies for developed countries.  
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DETERMINANTS OF CRIME RATES 
CRIME, DETERRENCE AND GROWTH IN POST LIBERALISED INDIA 
1. Introduction 
Crime degrades quality of life in many ways. It limits movement, thereby impeding 
access to possible employment and educational opportunities; it also discourages the 
accumulation of assets. As crime makes people risk averse, it retards entrepreneurial and 
other economic activity. Crime is also more ‘expensive’ for poor people in poor 
countries, as it (particularly violent crimes) can lead to medical costs and loss of 
productivity that poor people in developing countries are ill equipped to bear (UN, 2005). 
From a macro perspective, crime undermines the ability of the state to promote 
development.1 High crime rates can drive out foreign and domestic investment2 as well as 
skilled or high productive labor. Further, certain industries, like tourism, are especially 
sensitive to crime rates. 
 
Controlling crime rates, therefore, is particularly important in developing countries like 
India where large sums are spent on establishing and maintaining the police force and 
judicial system. Such intervention will be effective only if they are based on an 
understanding of crime and the factors determining crime rates. Consequently research 
that identifies determinants of criminal behavior and explores the relationships existing 
between criminal activity and different socio economic variables has substantial policy 
relevance.  
 
Initial theories of crime emphasized on the effect of poverty and social deprivation on 
crime rates (Shaw and McKay, 1942, Clowrad and Ohlin, 1960, Merton, 1968). Fleisher 
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(1963, 1966) pioneered the study of criminal behavior among economists. He argued that 
crime rates are positively associated with unemployment and low income levels. Ehrlich 
(1973), too, showed that low income levels led to high crime rates.  
 
Becker (1968), however, argued that a criminal should be viewed, not as a helpless 
victim of social oppression, but a rational economic agent. Like any other people, the 
potential criminal weighs costs/risks and benefits when deciding whether or not to 
commit crime: 
“some individuals become criminals because of the financial and other rewards 
from crime compared to legal work, taking account of the likelihood of 
apprehension and conviction, and the severity of punishment” (Becker, 1968: 
176).  
Among other important issues examined were the effects of police presence, convictions, 
and the severity of punishment on the level of criminal activity (Becker, 1968, Ehrlich, 
1973, 1975, 1996). This led to the development of deterrence theory, arguing that 
potential crimes evaluate both the risk of being caught and the associated punishment. 
The empirical evidence from developed countries confirmed that both factors have a 
negative effect on crime rates.  
 
Following these theories, a substantial body of empirical literature has originated in 
developed countries, attempting to identify determinants of crime. Similar studies have 
rarely been undertaken in developing countries. In fact this paper is possibly the first 
attempt to undertake a rigorous econometric analysis of determinants of crime in India. 
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The objective of this paper is to examine the impact of deterrence and socio-economic 
variables on crime rates in Indian states after the economic liberalisation of the 1990s. In 
particular, we seek to verify whether the theories of crime originating in developed 
countries are relevant in developing countries. 
 
The paper is arranged as follows. Section 2 presents some statistics on crime rates in 
India. This is followed by a discussion of the methodology in Section 3. We clarify the 
basis for selecting the variables used in the analysis and the nature of hypothesized 
relation of these variables with crime rates. This is followed by a justification of the 
econometric method. Section 4 presents the results, and extends the basic model by 
incorporating endogeneity. The paper concludes by discussing the implications of the 
findings.  
 
3. Data Sources and Methodology 
3.1 Crime in India 
In India, the Criminal Procedure Code divides crimes into two heads: cognizable and 
non-cognizable. In the case of cognizable crimes, the police has the responsibility to take 
prompt action on receipt of a complaint or of credible information. This action constitutes 
visiting the scene of crime, investigating the facts, apprehending the offender and 
producing the offending persons before the appropriate court of law. Cognizable crimes  
are again sub-divided as those falling under either the Indian Penal Code (IPC), or under 
the Special and Local Laws (SLL).3 Non-cognizable crimes, on the other hand, are left to 
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be pursued by the affected parties themselves in Courts. The police force initiates 
investigation into such crimes except with magisterial permission.  
 
Following literature, this paper considers only IPC crimes. The reason is that the 
motivations and enforcement mechanism for SLL crimes are different from that of IPC 
crimes. In India statistics on crime are published annually by the National Crime Records 
Bureau, under the Ministry of Home Affairs. State-wise data is available on number of 
different crimes committed, enforcement mechanism and judicial institutions in a 
standardized format. 
 
An analysis of the trend in crime rate over the study period reveals an overall increasing 
trend, with a sharp decrease in 2003 (Fig. 1). The rate of increase however is modest – 
9.2% between 1997 and 2006. This represents an annual increase of only 0.9%.  
Fig. 1: Trends in IPC in India - 1999 to 2006
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Over time, the nature of  crime has not changed drastically (Fig. 2). A comparison of the 
share of major types of crime committed in total IPC crimes in 1999 and 2006 shows 
marginal differences. Violent crimes and property related crimes remain the domiant 
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form of criminal activity in both the years. The largest increase has been for crimes 
against body (murder, attempt to murder, culpable homicide, kidnapping and abduction, 
etc.). There has also been a slight increase in economic crimes (criminal breach of trust, 
cheating and counterfeiting) and crimes against women, while property-related crimes 
(dacoity, robbery, burglary, theft, etc.) and crimes against public order have fallen by 
about 2%. 
Fig. 2: Changes in Type of Crime - 1999 & 2006
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2.2 Crime Function 
The hypothesis of this paper is that crime rates depend upon the deterrence effect and on 
the socio-economic structure. These two variables may be further decomposed into the 
following variables: 
1) Deterrence Variables: Deterrence variables like probabilities of being arrested 
and convicted determine the expected returns from crime (Becker, 1968, Ehrlich, 1973, 
1975, 1996, Grogger, 1991). Since these probabilities represent costs to criminals, their 
expected signs are negative. 
Now, the probability of being arrested depends on police performance. It may be 
captured by indicators like number of policemen per 1,000 of population, number of 
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IPC cases per civil policeman (representing load on the police force), rate of arrest (per 
thousand population), charge sheets filed as percentage of cases in which investigations 
were completed (probability of being charge-sheeted after committing a crime). On the 
other hand the probability of conviction depends on judiciary performance – conviction 
rates (proportion of cases tried resulting in convictions, representing the probability of 
being punished) and percentage of IPC cases disposed off within six months (speed in 
which punishment will occur). These data are also available in the annual publication by 
the National Crime Records Bureau. A list of data sources is given in the Appendix.  
2) Socio-Economic variables: The following socio-economic variables have been 
included in the analysis:  
a) Economic Growth: While Fleisher (1963, 1966) and Ehrlich (1973) considered 
the level of growth as a proxy for the level of economic prosperity, Bennett 
(1991) argues that the rate of growth is also important as it determines the 
generation of opportunities. He also finds that significant non-linear effects may 
be present. Figures on State Domestic Product at factor cost (constant at 1993-94 
prices) published by CSO has been used in this paper as a measure of economic 
growth.  
More important than growth (or growth rate), however, is the quality of growth. 
This is captured through poverty levels, urbanization and level of education.  
b) Inequality: Criminal activities are determined by economic motivations. Such 
motivations may be created by a sense of frustration, or an “envy effect” (Kelley, 
2000). A higher income inequality also means a worsening of legitimate earning 
opportunity, hence there is a possibility that a rise in income inequality would 
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increase crime – not only by creating potential criminals, but also potential 
victims having material goods worth seizing [Fleisher (1966), Ehrlich (1973), 
Chiu and Madden (1998), Burdett et. al (1999), Imrohoroglu et al. (2000, 2001), 
Kelly (2000), Fajnzylber et al. (2002), Burdett and Mortensen, (1998), Juhn, 
Murphy and Pierce (1993), Pratt and Godsey (2003)].  
c) Urbanization: The structural transformation from a predominantly rural economy 
to an urban one caused by multiple forces (of which industrialization is an 
important one) may increase the crime rate through different channels. For 
instance, increased levels of migration from rural to urban areas and attempts of 
elite groups to modernise may stimulate an increase in criminal activities (Fisher, 
1987). Urbanisation leads to congestion and insanitary living conditions. This 
generates social tension and leads to eruptions of violence and crime, particularly 
in communities characterized by diversity (UN, 2005). The process of 
urbanization may also lead to elimination and marginalization, driving out people 
from the legal market economy, so that they are forced into criminal activities for 
their livelihood. The rate of urbanization is also important (UN, 2005). Rapidly 
urbanizing areas may have more unstable population4 and little sense of 
community. This may lead to erosion of traditional collective socio-religious 
norms controlling crime (UN 2005). 
d) Education: Higher levels of educational attainment raise skill and abilities and are 
associated with higher returns in the labor market, thereby increasing the 
opportunity cost of criminal behavior (Freeman, 1991, 1996, Grogger, 1995, 
1998, Lochner and Moretti, 2001). Education may also have a ‘civilization 
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effect’, by improving moral stance and promoting the virtues of hard work and 
honesty (Fajnzylber et al 2002, Usher, 1997).  
This paper considers the proportion of people having at least middle class level of 
education in each state – available from the 2001 Census.  
 
2.3 Choice of Econometric Model 
The hypothesized form of the crime rate function therefore takes the following form: 
CRATE = φ(PM_D, IPC_PM, AR1, CSR1, CVR1, LPCSDP, URBAN, MEDU, INEQ)         [1] 
when,  CRATE: Number of IPC crimes per ’00,000 population 
 PM_D: No. of police men per ’000 square kilometer 
IPC_PM: No. of IPC cases per civil policeman 
AR1: Number of arrests in IPC cases per ’00,000 population in previous period 
CSR1: Percentage of IPC cases investigated in which charge sheets were filed in 
previous period 
CVR1: Conviction rate in previous period 
 PCSDP: Log of Per capita SDP at factor cost (constant price 1993-94) 
URBAN: Urbanization level  
MEDU: Percentage of persons with at least middle level of education 
 INEQ: Value of Gini coefficient for expenditure levels 
While most econometric analysis of crime rates assume that current values of deterrence 
variables affect the crime rate, this paper incorporates a lagged adjustment process.  The 
reason is that potential offenders can observe the values of deterrence-related variables 
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(AR, CSR and CVR) realized in the previous period, and estimate the probability of 
being apprehended and punished in the current period based on these observations.  
 
 Data on major Indian states has been used from 1999-2005. This constitutes a panel data. 
Econometric theory suggests that in such cases either of the following two forms may be 
used: 
(i) Fixed Effect Model: In this case intercept terms are assumed to be independent of 
Xit. The regression equation in terms of a single explanatory variable can be 
presented as  
CRATEit = αi + βXit + ui   [1a] 
where αi are intercept terms that vary across states (or state groups), but remain 
invariant across time. The OLS method is used to estimate [1a]. Recent works on 
crime, using panel data, adopt this method (Neumayer, 2003). 
(ii) Random Effect Model: Alternately, the intercept terms may be correlated with the 
explanatory variables. In that case, αi are modeled as random variables and 
treated at par with the error term.  
CRATEit = βXit + ei    [1b] 
where ei = αi + ui. Since the error terms of same cross-sectional units become 
correlated, though errors from different cross-sectional units are independent5 –
Generalized Least Square (GLS), rather than OLS, should be used to estimate the 
model. 
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We argue that neither of these approaches is suitable in the present case. The situation in 
states like Kerala and Andhra Pradesh (where substantial progress has been made in 
human development) vary from under-developed states like Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, 
Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh, or states like Maharashtra and Gujarat (where  the level of 
industrialization is high, but this has failed to reduce poverty levels). Therefore the 
regression model no longer remains a single equation, but is transformed into a set of 
stacked equations (Green, 2002: 615) that can be represented as follows: 
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   [1c] 
where yi, βi and ui are vectors and Xi, are matrices for each state group (i =1, 2, …m).  
 
Apparently the individual classical regression equations in [1c] are unrelated. Zellner 
(1962), however, points out that even these seemingly unrelated regression equations 
(SURE) may be linked statistically, though not structurally. Such links may be 
established through subtle interactions if “the response of the dependent variable to an 
explanatory variable is different for different individuals but for a given individual it is 
constant over time” (Judge et al, 1985: 539). This will result in random disturbances 
associated with at least some of the different equations being correlated with each other 
in a specific way - the disturbances will be independent over time, but correlated across 
cross-section units. The joint nature of distribution of error terms and non-diagonality of 
the associated variance-covariance matrix will arise if there are omitted variables that are 
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common to all equations. For instance, factors like the presence of a common civil code 
and procedure, spill-over effects of socio-economic developments in states, macro-
economic changes in the Indian economy, and so on, may be omitted factors subtly 
linking the equations for states.  
 
In this situation, estimation of parameters by OLS – which treats the model as a set of 
distinct equations - may generate consistent, but not efficient, estimators: 
“… treating the model as a collection of separate relationships will be sub-optimal 
when drawing inferences about the model’s parameters. Indeed, … in general the 
sharpness of these inferences may be improved by taking account of the jointness 
inherent in the SURE model rather than ignoring it.” (Srivastava and Giles, 1986: 
2). 
In such cases, Zellner (1962) advocates the application of GLS to the stacked model to 
ensure asymptotic efficiency of the estimators. This method has not been widely used in 
the study of crime – Pogue’s analysis (1986) seems to be the only application of the 
SURE model. 
 
3. Results and Discussion 
3.1 Basic Model 
The result for model [1] is given in Table 1. The values of chi-square and the pseudo-R2 
are both high. 
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Table 1: Seemingly Unrelated Regression 
Equation          Obs  Parms        RMSE    "R-sq"       chi2        P 
crate             153      9    40.17941    0.6651     303.91   0.0000 
 
 
             |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
crate        | 
      lpcsdp |   55.10487    12.0677     4.57   0.000     31.45262    78.75712 
       urban |  -.1161838   .3696654    -0.31   0.753    -.8407146     .608347 
        medu |   .6106737   .4497421     1.36   0.175    -.2708046    1.492152 
        ineq |  -178.7391   90.52834    -1.97   0.048    -356.1713   -1.306771 
        pm_d |   -.217824   .1092243    -1.99   0.046    -.4318997   -.0037483 
      ipc_pm |   33.15474    3.98676     8.32   0.000     25.34084    40.96865 
         ar1 |   11.36068    2.28241     4.98   0.000     6.887236    15.83412 
        csr1 |   .7262945   .2492461     2.91   0.004     .2377811    1.214808 
        cvr1 |    .699804   .1865921     3.75   0.000     .3340902    1.065518 
       _cons |  -215.9449   48.72119    -4.43   0.000    -311.4366   -120.4531 
 
It can be seen that the coefficients LPCSDP and all the deterrence variables are 
statistically significant. Analysis of the correlation matrix for the socio-economic 
variables shows that LPCSDP is highly correlated with URBAN and MEDU; further, 
these two variables are also strongly correlated with each other. This would imply the 
presence of multi-collinearity and explain the relatively low t-values observed for these 
two variables. The correlation between INEQand LPCSDP, on the other hand, is not very 
high (0.2366).  
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Table 2: Correlation Matrix of Socio-Economic Variables 
             |   lpcsdp     medu    urban     ineq 
-------------------------------------------------- 
      lpcsdp |   1.0000 
        medu |   0.5260   1.0000 
       urban |   0.5497   0.4619   1.0000 
        ineq |   0.2366   0.0124   0.1512   1.0000  
 
Analysis of the signs of coefficients of socio-economic variables reveals mixed results. 
Economic growth has actually led to an increase in crime rates. The reason lies in the 
quality of growth occurring after liberalization. Liberalization operates in many ways: 
1. It has increased inequalities, and hence social tension. 
2. The capital intensive nature of industrialization has squeezed the growth of 
employment opportunities for the general public.  
3. Rising consumerism has led to a sharp increase in consumer demand. Coupled 
with restrictions on legal means to satisfy this demand, this may lead to an 
increase tendency towards relying on criminal means to satisfy this demand. 
Simultaneously, rising education levels – without any corresponding increase in 
economic opportunities for the masses – seems to have led to increasing frustration with 
legal means of livelihood, and increased crime rates. The increasing employment 
opportunities created by urbanization, on the other hand, seems to lower crime rates. 
Although INEQ has a negative coefficient, it is not statistically significant.  
 
The coefficients of deterrence variables, except PM_D, are all positive. While the signs 
of IPC_PM and PM_D are expected – increasing pressure on the police force, or fewer 
policemen, will both encourage a potential criminal to think that (s)he can get away with 
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crime – the positive values of variables like AR1, CSR1 and CVR1 do not match with 
empirical findings in developed countries.  
 
 
 
3.2 Introducing Endogeneity 
One possible reason for the unexpected signs of some of the coefficients may be the 
presence of endogeneity in the model - the deterrence variables both determine and are 
determined by crime rates (Ehrlich, 1973, 1975, Brier and Fienberg, 1980, Pogue, 1986). 
For instance, arrest rates is determined by lagged crime rates, while increasing arrest – 
following complaints before the police – may lead to higher number of charge sheets.  
Model [1] has to be revised to: 
 
CRATE = φ (PM_D, IPC_PM, AR1, CSR1, CVR1, LPCSDP, URBAN, MEDU, INEQ)  [2a] 
AR1 = η (CRATE2)          [2b] 
CSR1 = γ (AR1)         [2c] 
where  CRATE2: Two period lagged crime rate 
The system of simultaneous equations given by [2a] to [2c] has also been estimated using 
Zellner’s SURE model.  
                          Table 3: Seemingly Unrelated Regression with Endogeneity 
Equation          Obs  Parms        RMSE    "R-sq"       chi2        P 
crate             126      9    21.15155    0.9080    1514.31   0.0000 
ar1               126      1    .4128065    0.8568     826.26   0.0000 
csr1              126      1    13.63342    0.4295      79.97   0.0000 
 
 
             |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
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crate        | 
      lpcsdp |   28.69313   6.036627     4.75   0.000     16.86156     40.5247 
       urban |  -.2032224   .1711119    -1.19   0.235    -.5385955    .1321507 
        medu |  -.2882367   .2163142    -1.33   0.183    -.7122047    .1357313 
        ineq |  -50.53942   45.70085    -1.11   0.269    -140.1114    39.03261 
        pm_d |  -.0241665   .0522156    -0.46   0.643    -.1265072    .0781741 
      ipc_pm |   6.315295   2.410503     2.62   0.009     1.590796    11.03979 
         ar1 |   64.24988   2.719007    23.63   0.000     58.92073    69.57904 
        csr1 |  -.5768609   .1331665    -4.33   0.000    -.8378624   -.3158593 
        cvr1 |   .3429576   .0895689     3.83   0.000     .1674059    .5185094 
       _cons |   -68.1377   25.11722    -2.71   0.007    -117.3665   -18.90886 
ar1          | 
      crate2 |   .0148316    .000516    28.74   0.000     .0138203    .0158428 
       _cons |  -.1436531   .0916594    -1.57   0.117    -.3233022    .0359959 
csr1         | 
         ar1 |   9.865635   1.103216     8.94   0.000     7.703371     12.0279 
       _cons |   49.01142    2.78197    17.62   0.000     43.55886    54.46398 
 
Crime rates, is again found to be positively related to lagged arrest and conviction rates. 
One reason for this may be that the corruption and malpractices prevailing in most Indian 
jails makes it difficult for prisoners to discard their criminal tendencies. In fact, 
conviction often brutalizes persons imprisoned for simple felonies (Piehl and DiIulio, 
1995). Further, arrest and convictions typically mark a person as a permanent deviant, 
reducing his access to legal channels of livelihood (Grogger, 1995, Holzer et al, 2003, 
Pager, 2003, Seiter and Kadela, 2003).  In other words, arrest or conviction may 
perversely reinforce criminal behavior in many cases, so that criminals get caught in a 
‘crime trap’.6 Data from the National Crime Records Bureau reveal that recidivism is 
quite high - nearly 10 percent of arrested persons had previous criminal records. 
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Expectedly, the presence of more police personnel per square kilometer7 and fewer IPC 
cases per policemen are both associated with lower crime rates. High rates of charge 
sheeting, too, act as a deterrent, to reduce crime rates. 
 
Among the socio-economic variables, INEQ contuse to remain insignificant. Among the 
other variables, economic growth increases crime rates, while urbanization and education 
operate as controlling factors. 
 
4. Conclusion 
Our empirical exercise shows that the theory of criminal behaviour originating in the 
developed countries has limited relevance for developing economies like India. Given the 
demographic pressure and nature of economic growth the channels through which socio-
economic variables and deterrence factors operate in developed countries get blocked or 
even distorted in developing countries. This leads to causal relationships that do not 
match with empirical findings for developed countries, implying the need to take into 
account the specific causal mechanism operating in India while designing crime control 
measures. 
 
In India, for instance, intervention to control and reduce crime rate has relied on 
increasing expenditure on the police and judicial systems. This is expected to act as a 
deterrent by increasing the expected costs of committing a crime – as the probability of 
getting detected and punished will increase. This is in line with empirical findings for 
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developed countries, showing that deterrence is likely to have a significant negative 
impact on crime rates.  
  
However, the results of this econometric analysis show that high conviction rates will 
actually increase crime rates. This reveals inherent flaws in the criminal detection and 
corrective system. There is need for reforming the penal system to enable this system to 
rectify the behavioral pattern of criminals through education and the imparting of 
technical and vocational training, so that they can return to the mainstream after their 
release. 
 
Results of this paper show that economic growth and, in particular, its quality, is an 
important determinant of crime rates. Liberalization of the Indian economy has led to an 
acceleration of growth; the results of the endogenous model show that this need not 
reduce crime. This implies that growth process has to be participatory and create 
opportunities for the entire population in order to control crime rates. 
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END NOTES 
1
 A study of Brazil estimates that a 10 percent reduction in the homicide rate may raise per capita income 
by 0.2-0.8 percent over the next five years (World Bank, 2006). 
2
 As investors may view crime as sign of social instability, and feel that crime drives up the cost of doing 
business. Such costs include loss of goods, hiring security guards, building fences, installing alarm systems 
or security devices, and so on. 
3
 SLL include Arms Act, Gambling Act, Excise Act, Indian Passport Act, Copyright Act and so on. See 
page 27 of Crime in India, 2002 for a complete list. 
4
 Rate at which population changes households is high (UN, 2005). 
5
 That is cov(eit, eis) ≠ 0, though cov(eit, ejt). 
6
 Piehls and DiIulio (1995) cites an estimate of Lawrence Greenfeld (US Bureau of Justice Statistics) that 
94% of all State prisoners have either been convicted of a violent crime or been previously sentenced to 
probation or incarceration. Another study reports that two out of every three parolees re-enter prisons 
(Little Hoover Commission, 2003). Murray (2007) argues that even children of convicted parents may be 
social excluded. This may lead to development of criminal tendencies amongst them later on. 
7
 Although the coefficient of PM_D is not significant, it appears to be correlated with PM_POP (-0.3308). 
